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The definition of testamentary capacity or sound mind means that the testator has the ability to understand in a general way the nature and extent of the property to be disposed of, the testator’s relation to those who would naturally claim a substantial benefit from the will, and a general understanding of the practical effect of the will. Skelton v. Davis, 133 So.2d 432 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961).
When a testator’s will, trust, or other estate planning document is challenged, the court determines whether or not the testator had testamentary capacity at the time that the testator executed his estate planning documents. This is well established and is stated in many cases including Skelton (“The principle of law that testamentary capacity is to be judged solely at the time of the execution of the will is irrefragable and no authority need be cited”), and Hendershaw v. Estate of Hendershaw, 763 So.2d 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(“Testamentary capacity is determined only by the testator’s mental capacity at the time he executed his will”).
This rule of law was discussed and emphasized in the recent case of Scott v. Young, 2024 WL 4395136 (Fla. 5th DCA October 4, 2024). In that case decedent’s son Scott filed a petition for administration and objection to the petition filed by decedent’s daughter Young. Scott alleged that decedent lacked testamentary capacity at the time that decedent executed her codicil on September 20, 2018.
Young filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings that decedent did have capacity, based on an August 14, 2018 order from the guardianship court in a separate proceeding finding that decedent had testamentary capacity. The probate court agreed with Young and granted the motion, finding that the September 20, 2018 codicil was valid because decedent “was found to have testamentary capacity at that time.”
The appellate court reversed and remanded to the probate court for further proceedings. The court held that Scott sufficiently pleaded a basis to believe decedent did not have testamentary capacity, which the probate court had to accept as true, and that Young’s claim that decedent did have capacity had to be taken as unproved. The probate court “appeared to labor under a misconception that further proceedings were not needed because the guardianship order was dispositive on the question of the decedent’s capacity at the time of execution,” which was incorrect.
The appellate court held that the guardianship order was “certainly some proof of the decedent’s mental capacity leading up to the time she allegedly executed the codicil,” but it was insufficient to entitle Young to a judgment on the pleadings.